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The aim of this collection of articles is to provide some basic 
concepts on liability and insurance in international intermodal transport« 
It includes contributions in which latin American and other experts have 
expressed their personal opinions, as well as draft articles for conventions 
set forth from one to three years ago by the International Chamber of 
Commerce, UNCITRAL and some industrialized countries« A paper prepared 
by the Secretariat is also included« 
The first study? by Dr, Alfredo Mohorade, under the title "Combined 
transport: liability and other related problemŝ « provides a concise 
introduction to key issues which have been debated regarding the liability 
of the combined transport operator» The second contribution, by lie. Luis 
Roca Fernández, "Suggestions regarding insurance aspects that should be taken 
into account in the draft convention on international combined transport 
offers a set of principles to guide the search for the most appropriate 
system for Latin America. This is followed by a note by the Secretariat 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America, "Basic questions for the ' 
selection of a liability regime for international intermodal transport," 
which is written as a complement to the articles by Doctors Mohorade and 
Roca Fernández, and as an introduction to the excerpts from proposed 
international legislation which deals with liability regimes of the 
combined transport operator and of maritime lines which assume responsibility 
in the case of transshipment. 
These three articles are followed by the following documents: 
IV: Pertinent clauses of "The uniform rules for a combined transport 
document," issued by the International Chamber of Commerce. This is a 
version of the network system of liability, based explicitly on the draft 
Convention on International Combined Transport of Goods (TCM Convention)« 
V: Comments on the relationship between "The uniform rules for a 
combined transport document̂ " and the Hague Rules (Brussels Convention of 
1924) which delimits the responsibility of maritime liner operators» These 
comments,also refer to the rule of the combined transport operator as 
regards indemnities for loss or damage to the cargo under his responsibility« 
VI: A version of the network system of liability proposed in 1972 by 
the Government of France» 
VII: Articles for a uniform system of responsibility, with "strict 
liabilitŷ « proposed by several industrialized countries in 1972« 
VIII: Basic rules governing the responsibility of the maritime carrier, 
with "strict liabilitŷ « proposed as modifications of the Hague Rules, 
/I« Combined Transport 

1% COMBINED TRANSPORT 
LIABILITY AND 'OTHER RELATED PROBLEMS 
by Alfredo Mohorade 
1« The sudden appearance on the modern transport scene of the Combined 
Transport Operator - a physical or legal entity who assumes responsibility 
for the delivery of goods to an agreed destination by means of their 
material transfer by different modes of transport - calls for a clear 
definition of the nature of the relations between such Operators and the 
shippers, as well as the nature of the relations which will have to be 
established between the Operators and the owners of the companies directly 
responsible for the various stages of transports 
Because of this, the problem of liability assumes particular impor-
tance and the most determined efforts will have to be made to establish 
suitable and effective bases in this respect» in this connection, it 
should be clearly understood that the present paper does not claim to 
provide definite and specific solutions, but merely seeks to provide a 
schematic outline of the problem which can be used as a basis for later 
elaboration« 
2» The basis of liability The obligation to indemnify a person for 
damage caused to him falls into two major categories: (a) subjective 
liability based on negligence and (b) objective or strict liability« 
(a) Subjective liability: Under this type of liability, the 
person who undertakes to perform a duty — in this case the Combined 
Transport Operator — must pay damages when he fails in the performance 
of his duty, i«e«, when he "omits to perform those duties which are 
required by the nature of the obligation and are in keeping with the 
circumstances of the persons, time and place"® In other words, in this 
case the conduct of the alleged defaulter will have to be suitably 
evaluated, so as to determine his liability in respect of the claim 
against him8 The attitude of the person responsible for passing judge-
ment is obviously of great importance, for he will have to analyse a 
number of circumstances, as the above quotation from article 512 of the 
Civil Code of Argentina Indicates» 
/To give 
2 •• 
To give a specific definition of what is meant when it is said that 
someone is liable to the extent of his negligence, writers on the subject 
have come up with the most varied definitions, of which the best known is 
probably that of the brothers Mazeaud,. outstanding French jurists, who 
refer to "an error in conduct" as a means of distinguising negligence 
capable of generating consequent liability» The problem is far from easy, 
and indeed it is one of the most difficult in the whole field of law, for 
as already stated, a great deal depends on the individual view of the person 
who must judge the matter« 
The fact remains, however, that the great majority of countries have 
adopted as the basis of liability - except in a few cases which will be 
analysed further on - the subjective system or that based on proof of 
default» 
(b) . Objective liability; This system completely ignores any consi-
deration of the conduct of the person causing the damage or pf whether he 
is at fault or not* the only requirement being to prove the relation 
between the damage and the act causing such damage® 
This is the solution adopted by the various standard regulations 
governing occupational accidents, damages caused to third parties on the 
ground by aircraft, and nuclear accidents» Thus, for example, when a 
worker suffers an injury in the performance of his job, the employer must 
pay compensation, whether he was negligent or not, and if an object falling 
from an aircraft injures or kills a person on the ground, the obligation to 
pay compensation stems from the fact that the falling object caused the 
damage, it being of no importance whether the carrier has any defence 
whatever» The same is true for nuclear accidents» Objective liability 
i is based on the risk created by the owner of the object or activity 
concerned, his conduct in connection with the injury incurred being of 
no importance whatever in respect of his obligation to pay compensation« 
As regards combined transport, the various draft conventions drawn 
up by UN3DR0IT, the International Maritime Committee, IMCO, etc», have 
opted for the subjective liability system, whereas the U.S.A. seems to 
favour the system of objective liabilitŷ  
/This is 
. This.is one of the problems that must be dealt with by the Latin 
American Group in order to establish what they consider the most suitable 
position to be taken at the forthcoming discussions in Geneva. 
3» . The system of liability to be adopted«. Another matter with which 
the Group must deal in connexion with the possible ÇT Convention is what 
system of liability most effectively covers the. interests of the shippers« 
In view of . the fact that each mode of transport (road, rail, air, 
sea, inland waterways) is subject to specific international conventions or 
national legislation, it must be decided whether the regulations of the 
CT Convention will take precedence over the existing rules, or whether 
these will still govern each mode of transport separately» In the latter 
event, if damage occurs during transport by sea, the Brussels Convention 
will apply; with respect to air, the Warsaw Convention, etc® This system 
of liability is known as the "network system"» On the other hand, if it 
is decided that the Convention should enact its own regulations with respect 
to liability, whatever, the stage of the journey where the damage occurs 
(damage can occur not only while goods are in a means of transport, but 
also when in a warehouse, storehouse, shed or dockside in the country of 
origin, on the way or at the destination), a uniform system of liability 
will have been established« 
The arguments and reasons put forward in favour of one system or 
the other are many and varied, and the discussions on this particular 
aspect — especially with the highly developed countries (including thé 
USSR but excluding the USA) - may prove to be the most significant as 
well as the most barren» . 
This is a subject which has received very little attention so. far 
or has been dealt with very superficially by the countries of the Latin 
American Groupj this is understandable because this, group of countries 
has placed emphasis on and given priority to questions of an economic and 
political nature rather than juridical ones, since the latter are of a 
subsidiary nature» 
The issue cannot be avoided, however, and adequate preparations 
should be made by the Latin American countries so that they can fully 
/co-ordinate their 
co-ordinate their own strategy with that of the countries of the Group 77 
and enable a common front to be presented to the countries of groups B 
and D, 
In the light of the foregoing, the following paragraphs will set 
out some very general remarks on the subject® 
The highly-developed countries base their views on this matter on 
a single main premise» They say that while damage may be discovered during 
a particular stage of the transport, it may remain unnoticed until arrival 
at the final destination, in which case it would be impossible to establish 
where the damage occurred» 
The point is that the previously mentioned countries, when speaking 
of unitized transport, think only of containers and nothing more; this can 
be seen from the working papers distributed at Geneva, where the English 
versions made no mention of a meeting on "Combined Transport" but referred 
instead to a meeting on "International Container Traffic"» 
In reality, however, combined transport involves rather the 
development of the institution of combined transport operators, one of 
whose methods of operation - but only one - is the use of containers» 
What is of greatest interest to the developing countries is not 
how the goods are transported (on pallets, in containers, etc»), but what 
liability is borne and what guarantees are offered by the Combined Transport 
Operators« The most recent experiment of the developed countries has been 
to put forward the International Chamber of Commerce document (another 
matter to be studied by the latin American Group), which is along the same 
lines as the various combined transport drafts rejected in the past» 
The countries of the Group 77 may decide to insist that the combined 
transport operators should be subject to extensive liabilities and should 
provide ample guarantees that they will carry out their obligations. If 
so, it is logical to advocate the adoption of a uniform system of liability, 
rejecting any form of liability based on the "network system"» The reasons 
for this are twofold, as outlined below» 
Firstly, approaching the question from the point of view of the 
shipper, it is essential from the start of the transport operation that 
/both he 
both he and the insurer should know the Operator with whom he enters into 
a contract will be liable. If, from, the outset, the shipper and the insurer 
are fully aware of the defences open to the Operator and the limitations on 
the latter1s liability, there will automatically be greater security in the 
transactions» 
Secondly, our countries must counter the developed countries' viewpoint 
by emphasizing that since all transport conventions - or at least those 
regarding maritime and air transport - are in a state of crisis (clear proof 
of this is provided by the UNGITRAL effort and the Guatemala Protocol), it 
would be ridiculous to continue to maintain systems which are being revised» 
Assuming, then, that the basis of the liability of the CTO would be 
the "uniform system" - i»e<,,. the system of. liability would be the same 
whatever the stage of transport at which the damage occurred - the defences 
which the CTO could put forward against the shippers claim must be analyzed» 
In this respect, it should be mentioned that various systems exist 
side by side, depending on the degree to which the countries concerned .apply 
the various international conventions or, as regards the applicable national 
legislation, the mode of transport involved» 
In the continental group of countries or those using the Napoleonic 
Gode, if a claim was made against the carrier (in this case the CTO),. he 
could put forward the defence of "force majeure" and its variations, such 
as inherent vice in the object.or default by the shipper. This meant that 
if the person under the obligation to deliver goods received by him for 
transport showed that an event was either unforseeable or unavoidable 
(storms, strikès, fire, etc«) he was not liable in any way» 
The shipowners objected strongly to this, however, and sought to 
specify the defences which could be put forward against claims by shippers. 
This gave rise to what are known as the Hague Rules, which were subsequently 
incorporated in the Brussels Convention of 1924» This lays down that in 
the main, once a maritime carrier has fulfilled his duty of exercising due 
diligence tó ensure the seaworthiness of his ship, he can escape liability 
by invoking one of the subparagraphs of article 4 of the Convention» 
/It should 
It should be noted in this connexion that in recent years there 
have been a number of attacks on the existing system (i.e., that followed 
by the States which have acceded to the Brussels Convention), especially 
at the meetings held by UNCITRAL® It is not possible in the present paper 
to go into all that has transpired to date, but for reference purposes 
those who are interested should read the UNCTAD working paper (TD/B/C»4/ 
ISL/6/Rev0 l) as well as the various UNCITRAL documents on the work done 
so far» 
The idea would seem to be to follow the recent trends set by air 
transport laws, which would be widened to include traditional situations 
specific to maritime law (fire, reasonable deviation)« 
In this connexion, the reader is recommended to study the work by 
thé Venezuelan jurist Dr. Julio Sânchez-Vegas entitled "Recomendaciones 
que van a regir una pdliza de seguro en una Empresa de Transporte Combinado", 
in which he discusses possible solutions to the problem* 
While it is true that no-one can pretend to be the possessor of the 
ultimate truth on this matter, it may be noted that the world-wide trend at 
the moment is towards widening the liability of any person contracting an 
obligation« In this respect it would be worth while (for example), reading 
the views of legal experts on liability arising in connexion with the use 
of motor vehicles, in both its extracontractual and contractual aspects 
(including the carriage of goods and passengers without payment)« 
In this connexion, however, it should be made quite clear that there 
can be no question of the developed countries beating a strategic retreat 
as regards liability in maritime transport by going back to the acceptance 
of a wide range of defences when it is a question of combined transport® 
Such a course cannot be accepted as a serious possibility and should be 
rejected out of hand, 
A sound procedure would be for the legal experts of the region to 
keep in close contact with each other as the most effective means of 
co-ordinating ideas on this burning issue of CTO liability, with the 
ultimate aim of joint planning with African and Asian jurists» This 
would be the ideal solution in order to enable the Group 77 to present 
a common front against the countries of groups B and D® 
/5* Other questions 
4* Other questions to be dealt with» While recognizing that this 
depends on the achievement of the necessary progress in each case, the 
following points must inevitably be studied by the latin American Group 
in connexion with a possible TCM Convention; 
(i) Obligatory or optional nature of the TCM Convention: 
(1) Hist the Convention cover all combined transport situations? 
Will it be optional? How can the shippersT rights be guaranteed most 
effectively? 
(ii) Issue of the CT document: 
(l) Is this to be done by the CT operator? (2) Will the 
shipper have the right to demand its issue? 
(iii) Negotiability of the CT document: 
(l) Should it be negotiable or not? (2) Wh(> is responsible 
for specifying the nature of the document, the CTO or the shipper? 
(3) What is the role of the guarantor banks to be? 
6« Conclusion» Here I wish to repeat the statement that there is no 
intention on my part to offer any solution in this document, the only aim 
of which is to provide a brief review of the subject, on which so far 
little has been said» 
It may be noted, for example, that only Argentina, Paraguay and 
Peril have acceded so far to the Brussels Convention of 1924» Due 
consideration should also be given to the fact that the first of these 
countries is currently studying the possibility of reforming its internal 
legislation which is at present along the lines of the principles of the 
Convention, while objections have been raised in the country against the 
said Convention.. 
It would therefore be highly desirable if experts on the subject 
were to come to the meeting in Buenos Aires to help to formulate with the 
greatest possible care the position to be taken over liability'vis-a-vis 
the other regional groups» 
/ 
lit SUGGESTIONS REGARDING INSURANCE ASPECTS THAT SHOUID HE 
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMBINED TRANSPORT 
by Lais Roca Fernlndes 
The adoption of a combined transport eonvention will certainly bring 
about changes in the form of insurance of international trade merchan-
dise, since it involves the creation of a new entity — the combined 
transport operator (CTO) - some of whose responsibilities will be 
different from those of current, transport operators. 
Assuming that the adoption of this convention is based on a genuine 
desire to achieve progress in and make improvements to existing 
systems of world trade and to simplify the problems encountered, it, 
can also be assumed that the intention is to correct shortcomings 
as regards responsibility for transport and the protection afforded 
by insurance» 
At present, the various kinds of agreements and legislation impose 
very little responsibility on the transporters and carriers, 
compared with the owners of,the cargo, to such an extent that this 
has given rise to the phenomenon of double and triple insurance, 
since the suppliers and owners of the cargo prefer to take out their 
own insurance than to embark on litigation against the transport 
operators, who benefit from a large number of exemptions» 
If international transport is to be improved, then at the same time 
something must be done to put ah end to this excessive flexibility 
as regards the responsibility of the person effecting the entire 
shipping operation, since any combined transport enterprise must 
be a professional^ responsible and financially solvent entity if 
it is to be worthy of its function» 
Considering that it is the person who effects the transport operation 
who must guarantee that the merchandise arrives safely on time, it 
/does not 
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does not seem logical that his responsibility should be so flexible 
as to remove any incentive to be more Efficient and reliable because 
of the knowledge that the owners or suppliers of the cargo are 
reluctant to take legal action in view of the small chance of 
obtaining any fair compensation for the loss or damage suffered» 
6« The solution, therefore, must be for the person responsible for 
the transport operation to be likewise entirely responsible to the 
owners of the goods entrusted to him in respect of all contingencies 
that may arise® In this way, only one insurance should be necessary 
to cover the transport operator1s risks, yet this would cover all 
the risks involved in modern transport operations® 
7® Once there is a guarantee that the transport operator (whether a 
combined transport operator or not) will assume all risks involved 
in the transport operation, the owner or supplier obviously no 
longer needs to take out insurance of his own, since he knows that 
he will be adequately and fairly compensated in the event of any 
mishap® ' 
8® Since the risks to be assumed by the transport operator will be 
precisely specified* they can all,be covered by a cargo policy 
incorporating the new risks involved in the entire transport 
operation, and although this expanded coverage will increase 
the cost, this will be offset by the saving on the double and 
triple insurance, which will obviously no longer be taken out, 
and as a result the overall cost will remain the same or even 
be reduced® 
9« If any real progress is to be made in the field of insurance, a 
solution must be sought whereby the shipper will effectively assume 
his responsibilities, thus avoiding a situation in which the other 
parties to the transaction have to make up for his shortcomings® 
If the situation is approached in this way, the insurance industry 
can be relied upon to provide the necessary coverage for this type 
/of risk 
~ 3 ~ 
of risk in the cargo insurance branch, which is less costly than 
insurance for liability» 
10« If a solution based on cargo insurance is adopted, the repercussions 
on the insurance markets of the developing countries will certainly 
be less serious than they would be if the coverage of these risks 
were assigned to liability insurance, as our countries have much 
more experience in cargo insurance than in liability, which, because 
of its wide-ranging and specialized nature, tends to be handled on 
the international market« 
11, Quite apart from the fact that the type of responsibility imposed 
on the transport operator (whether a combined transport operator or . 
not) must be stricter and more specific in its effective application* 
there are other aspects of the problem which must be borne in mind 
too, such as the fact that the Convention must stipulate that the 
insurance taken out by the transport operator must be issued by a 
company in the country of the purchaser or owner of the goods« 
12» This principle that the insurance must be taken out in the country 
of the purchaser of the goods is based on the simple fact that the 
price to the buyer includes all the costs, which have been transferred 
to the price of the article, so it is not desiralbe to further 
increase the price of imports through the cost of foreign insurance, 
when this can be taken out in the buyer1s own country, thereby 
bringing about a saving in foreign currency and a strengthening of 
the local insurance market — a position which was accepted by all 
countries in the resolution on insurance adopted at UNGTAD III» 
23» Consequently, the international combined transport convention or 
any other instrument adopted should incorporate this advance made 
by the developing countries in the field of insurance, since it 
will certainly put an end to CIF purchases, which have such a bad 
effect on the already deteriorated foreign trade balances of our 
countries« 
/U. I believe 
14« I believe that a joint position of latin American.countries can 
be mapped out along the lines indicated above, since the precise 
technical solutions to be adopted can be studied at the same time 
as the type of liability which is to cover international trade is 
being defined® 
15» Consequently, the principles that should be taken into account in 
the field of insurance aret that the insurance covering the new 
modes of transport should come under the cargo insurance branch, 
in which we already have experience and underwriting capacity; 
that the liability of the person responsible for the transport 
operation, whether a combined transport operator or not (we should 
not commit ourselves to accepting the combined transport operators 
as an established fact),, should be sufficiently strict and specific 
for it to be made effective rapidly and without paperwork; and that 
the insurance should be taken out by the transport operator in the 
country purchasing and paying for the goods, in order to conform to 
the UNCTAD resolution in support of national insurance marketŝ  
Ill; BftSIC QUESTIONSSMlJ^^^SSJPlíJF^J^^^JJl REGIWE^FOR 
ÎNTE R W JJ^NSPORT 
Note by the Secretariat 
The purpose of this short essay is to suggest some of the basic 
considerations for the selection of a liability regime for the Combined 
Transport Operator, It is written as a complement to the articles by 
Dr, Alfredo Mohorade and Dr. Luis Roca Fernández, included in this same 
anthology, and as an introduction to the exerpts from proposed inter-
national legislation which deals with liability regimes of these 
operators and of maritime lines which assume responsibility in the case 
of transshipment. : 
Three principles are offered to guide the choice of liability 
regimes, as follows: 
1. Ample^insurance coveragê  availablê  to the_ user^ witĥ  each inter-
ESáiSr^S^^ySirE liabilitŷ  nscessary^to insurê  honesty careful_and 
expedite handling of the cargo and documerrtationj without unnecessarily 
complicating^the^ P ro c e d j ^ ^ c ^ i n g ^ i n s u r a n-cê  sdmir̂ -
istration_costgj_end_perroittinĝ thê  user jo_tal5ĝ adyantagg_of_ self-
insurance_or his own̂  open policies ybg£g_it_ia_mosti gonyenignt_ for_him. 
With regard to this principle, several key decisions must be made: 
a) Among the n.ost controversial issues is the effectiveness of 
liability based on fault as a means to insure honest, careful and 
expedite handling of the cargo and documentation by the transporters 
and other enterprises engaged in cargo handling. 
There are two extreme positions on this issue, both of which 
merit serious analysis. One position is that the cargo owner ought to 
rely on his own cargo insurance, and that only under very special 
circumstances would the insurer try to recuperate the indemnization 
74-9-2149 
/from a transporter 
I / from a transporter or other agency responsible for cargo handling, — 
This argument presumes.that responsible actions by the CTO, transporter 
or other cargo-handling agency should depend on careful regulation of 
entry into these activities by the governments, according to strict 
predetermined international norms and national legislation, and on the 
factor of competition among different transport modes, different CT0*s, 
or different intermodal transport combinations. The proponents of this 
point of view assert that liability based on fault is only occasionally 
an effective mechanism to bring about more responsible attitudes and 
actions, in part because in many cases there is little actual dis-
crimination among different entities as to premiums charged, in part 
because premiums are usually small relative to the freight and in part 
because the premiums aire passed on to the clients. 
The other position is in favor of strict liability, whereby only 
in very exceptional circumstances can the CTO, transporter or other 
cargo-handling agency cite exemptions from responsibility, and in any 
case would carry the burden of proof. Proponents of this point of view 
consider liability based on fault to be an effective incentive to 
responsible attitudes and actionsJ that CTO's, transporters and other 
cargo-handling agencies would have to have their own insurance anyway, 
and that strict liability on their part would avoid the necessity of 
l/ Some CTO®s and land transport companies in Latin America presently 
adopt this principle, at least as an alternative for the user. One 
mechanism is that the user takes out a cargo insurance policy and 
endorses it to thB CTO or transporter. This is not compatible with 
international intermodal transport of sealed unit-loads, unless the 
policy is endorsed to the CTO. A second mechanism is that the cargo 
insurer draws up a letter indicating that it will not attempt to 
recuperate from the CTO or the transporters. Insurers charge a certain 
percentage over the regular premium when these mechanisms are used, 
/separate cargo 
separate cargo insurance; and that service agencies should be prepared 
in general to respond directly to the client for all aspects of the 
services provided according ti> the terms of the contract between the 
client and the agency, 
b) Another key question concerns the desirability of creating a 
new insurance which is added to carrier*s liability insurance and cargo 
insurance. From one point of view, this complicates excessively the 
situation as regards indemnization or litigation. From another point of 
view, this is necessary in order that the CTO is made to assume liability 
in relation to the responsibilities he contracts regarding the delivery, 
delay, damage or loss of the cargo. It should be noted that there is 
general consensus that in previous debates on this subject, there was 
considerable confusion on the meaning of "third insurance," Presumably, 
when a new insurance is created, not to replace existing, insurance but 
which does assume some of the coverage of the previously existing 
insurance, premiums of each of the insurance policies are adjusted to 
the new situation. The additional costs to the user with the addition 
of a "third insurance" should be limited to administrative costs of 
that insurance and to coverage not provided to the owner of the 
merchandise previously, 
c ) A third crucial question is the importance of associating 
risk and premiums. On this, there is a considerable difference in 
Latin America between land transport and maritime insurance premiums, 
and in general between unitized cargo and non-unitized cargo insurance 
premiums. There are years of experience and large amounts of accumu-
lated data for the determination of cargo insurance premiums in the case 
2/ of non-unitized maritime transport, . 
2/ However, insurers in more industrialized countries tend to discrimin-
ate less among cargo routes than the comparative risks would seem to warrant 
They establish premiums close to world-wide averages, and the insurers in 
the developing countries must charge considerably more at times since they 
must respond more to local conditions, 
/In some cases, 
In some cases, special discounts are offered for palletized or 
containerized goods, but especially with regards to containers, there is 
still a certain amount of uncertainty» Insurers that have offered 
discounts for containerized goods in some cases withdrew these discounts 
when entire containers began to disappear, and the same premiums were 
again charged for unitized and non>-unitized cargo. 
In the case of Latin American international land transport, the 
insurers do not"have the experience or data necessary to discriminate 
among premiums, according to risk. At present, on South American 
transcontinental routes, cargo insurance rates are seven or eight times 
more when maritime transport is used rather than land transport. This 
same low land transport premium is charged on other land routes, where 
the risks are evidently much greater. In the face of any large-scale 
loss by insurers, they may react as did the international insurers in 
the face of concentrated container losses, increasing premiums to 
maritime transport levels and eliminating one of the natural advantages 
that land transport offers. Ideally, insurers will have the. data or 
antecedents in order to make more discrimination of rates, relating . 
them to risks. 
In the case of both cargo insurance and customs* guarantees (for 
the cargo, containers or vehicles], one system used is a special fund 
or guarantee system set up and operated by the transporters or CTO*s 
themselves. It should be kept in mind that this system tends to lead 
to lack of discrimination among premiums or fees paid into the fund on 
the basis of the risk experience in the case of each participating 
transporter or CTO. The implication is a subsidy from more responsible 
to less responsible participants. 
/ 2. Ample opportunities 
5 
2m Ample opportunities for the user to file insurance claims, and 
ability to carry out litigation where necessary without undue costs or 
difficulties of obtaining and using available evidence in his favor. 
Major problems for the implementation of this principle include 
the following: 
a) The problem where there is no agent of the CTO or transporter 
which is at fault, in the same locality as that of the owner of the 
cargo. This, of course, implies more difficulty on the part of the 
user in settling claims. 
b) The problem of jurisdiction over the case, in the case of 
litigation, wherein the owner of the goods at the time of damages or 
loss has difficulties of access to the courts which have jurisdiction 
over the case, 
c) The problem that in Latin America it is common that cargo 
insurers learn of damages past the date when claims can be filed. This 
has led to the routine filing of claims in some places, even without 
evidence that the CTO or carrier were really responsible, and in turn, 
a habit on the part of some carriers of ignoring the first filing of 
a claim, 
d) The problem where the CTD and the carrier are the same, and 
where the user is dependent on the CTO for evidence against the carrier, 
A basic question, in addition to the above problems, is how to 
implement the norm that the CTD should represent the owner of the cargo 
during litigations. Reference is made here to the opinion of experts 
consulted that independently of the position which the CTO has during 
litigations, he is not entitled to collect a different amount from 
transporters or other cargo-handling agencies than the amount of indemn-
ity which his insurer pays to the owner of the cargo. The opinions of 
these experts aire summarized in Part VI. 
/3, Insurance and 
3. Insurance and reinsumnce_arrgngements such that an Increasing 
share of the market is insured^by Latin American institutions9 and that 
a high and increasing proportion Ofthe net collections (total premiums 
minus premiums reinsured outside of country plus indemnizations returned 
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to country) remain in the Latin American country. 
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Major questions which must be answered with respect to the 
implementation of this principle include the following! 
a) The proportion of total coverage for which each type of 
insurance responds in practice must be clarified. Traditionally in 
Latin America, the national insurers have been able to insure directly 
the cargo to a great extent, while they are in a much weaker position 
to Insure transporters* liability, particularly in the case of maritime 
transport. There are great variations as to the proportion of the cargo 
insurance premiums which are reinsured abroad, 
< There has been considerable conjecture that an insurance to cover 
the CTO*s liability would, like maritime liability, be difficult for 
the Latin American insurers to absorb. 
The different proposals which have been made with regard to CTD's 
liability, and which are included in this anthology, may be distinguished 
grafically according to the amount of thè total coverage for which each 
insurance is really likely to respond. Graph 1 illustrates these dif-
ferences.. 
With the no-fault liability system, thè amount of coverage offered 
by the carriers, ports, warehouses and CTO's would be quite small , 
and the1 rest would have to be covered by cargo insurance* 
The present situation, where the carriers, warehouses and ports 
normally enjoy extensive exemptions from liability, involves a division 
between the coverage by the insurance of the cargo-handling agencies 
and cargo insurance. 
/Graph 1 
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Alternative with CTO: 
No fault t̂iii'ji 




KEY: i'|ii'iniii Insurance of carriers, ports and warehouses 
..:.' —',., CT0®s insurance 
Cargo insurance or self-insurance 
NOTES: The proportions are meant to be illustrative and are only intended to show 
relative differences as to the amount of the total risk covered by each type 
of insurance. It is assumed that the major leg of the movement is via maritime 
transport'. It is assumed that containerization results in 25°/o less total risk, 
with a greater percentage reduction for the carriers* insurance, and that 
the intervention of the CTD results in 10%20% or 25$ less risk in the case 
of no fault insurance, the network system or strict liability, respectively. 
The intervention of the CTO could have the effect, apart from 
whatever liability he carries, of increasing the amount of risk covered 
in practice by the carriers, ports and warehouses (shown by the arrow 
marked A), This is because he should be in a better position than the 
owner of the targo, or of many cargo insurers, to pinpoint which cargo-
handling agency was at fault for damages. 
Apart from this, the choice of alternative proposals for network 
system or strict liability should have little impact on the amount of 
risk covered by the carriers, ports and warehouses. Much more important 
is the division of coverage of risk between cargo insurance and the 
CT08s liability. 
With the network system ( see Parts V and VII), the amount of 
coverage by the CTQ depends on the manner the cargo is packaged. In 
the case of the full container load (FCL), the CTO usually receives the 
container from the shipper already packed and sealed. This means that 
the CTO can make use of a very important exemption under the proposed 
systems - when the fault lies with (or could be shown to have been due 
to) poor packing of the container. In litigation on hidden damage of 
cargo in containers, this exemption is very important. 
In the case of the less than container load (LCL), the C70 
normally assumes responsibility for packing the container. His pro-
portion of the total coverage will be quite a bit more, therefore, than 
in the case of FCL shipments. 
In the case of break-bulk or palletized shipments under the network 
system, one might suppose that the situation would be the same as with 
LCL shipments. However, experience shows that when CTO'S pack containers, 
they are very attentive to the preparation or wrapping of the shipments 
they receive from the shipper, and will reject any shipments which 
have any signs of defects. Thus we can assume that the CTO*s coverage 
of risk is increased with LCL shipments, 
/Finally, the 
Finally, the proposed strict liability systems (see Fferts VIII 
and IX) imply a large-scale transfer of coverage of.risk from cargo 
insurance to^CTO's liability. .. 
,b) The second question to be answered is the likelihood that -
premiums will be.adjusted to the new reality of actual coverage of 
risks. If there is a large scstle transfer of coverage from cargo 
insurance to CTO*s liability, ..will the former then experience reduced 
premiums? As. was noted earlier, when there are radically new risk 
situations, there can be brusk changes of premiums on the basis of the 
insurers* consideration of the importance and direction of certain 
factors. A large-scale loss can lead to a reversion to much higher 
schedules, and there can be a very long period of adjustments based on 
accumulated experience. These transitory periods can involve higher 
total premiums paid by the shippers, and temporarily higher or lower 
outflow of exchange in the form of reinsurance (which is especially 
important when there is fear of possible concentration of risk) or 
premiums on policies from foreign countries. 
c) Extremely important are the implications of the CTD's activ-
ities for the concentration of risk» If there is little or wo greater 
concentration of risk than at present, the transfer of coverage from 
cargo insurance to CTD*s liability should not have much impact on the 
ability of the Latin American countries to retain increasing propor-
tions of net collections, assuming that the insurance industry adopts 
or is permitted to adopt measures to be able to offer appropriate types 
of policies for cargo movements under combined transport documents. 
Even if there is greater concentration of risk due to the CTD*s 
activities, the Latin American insurance industry could offer insurance 
to cover the CTO*s liability, with high retention levels in the region, 
by means of pools. 
/d) Finally, there 
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d) Finally, there is the feasibility of reducing the disparity 
among national insurance legislations in Latin America, This disparity 
has resulted in an inability by insurers of the region to offer the most 
appropriate coverage for international intermodal cargo movements. 
Although this legislation is oriented toward thé protection of the 
development of rational insurance industries, the insurers of the region 
are not permitted to combine their resources and thus to offer competi-
tive. policies for door-to-door transport risk coverage. Also, combined 
transport operators formed by multi-national firms with substantial 
capital have advantages in backing up the responsibilities they assume 
for the cargo, in comparison with local operators that must rely on 
local insurers. -
IV i tNJFOflM RULES FOR A COMBINED TRANSPORT DOCUMENT * 
of the International Chamber of Commerce 
Liability for loss or damage 
A, Rules applicable when the stage of transport where the loss or 
damage occurred is not known* 
Rule 11 
When in accordance with Rule 5 (e) hereof the CTO is liable to pay 
. compensation in respect of loss of, or damage to the goods and the 
stage of transport where the loss or damage occurred is not known» 
(a) such compensation shall be calculated by reference to the value 
of such goods at the place and time they are delivered to the 
consignee or at the place and time when, in accordance with the 
contract of combined transport, they should have been so delivered; 
(b) the value of the goods shall be determined according to the current 
commodity exchange price or, if there is no such price, according 
to the current market price, or, if there is no commodity 
exchange price or current market price, by reference to the 
normal value of goods of the same kind and quality; 
(c) compensation shall not exceed 30 francs per kilo of gross weight 
of the goods lost or damaged, unless, with the consent of the CTO, 
the consignor has declared a higher value for the goods and such 
higher value has been stated in the CT document, in which case 
such higher value shall be the limit« . 
However, the CTO. shall not, in any case, be liable for an amount greater 
than the.actual loss to the person entitled to make the claim. 
* These rules were explicitly based on the draft Convention on the 
; International Combined Transport of Goods (TCM), 
/Rule 12 
12 
When the stage of transport where the loss or damage occurred is 
not known the CTO shall not be liable to pay compensation in 
accordance with Rule S (e) hereof if the loss or damage was 
caused by; 
(a) an act or omission of the consignor or consignee, or person 
other than the CTO acting on behalf of the consignor or 
consignee, or from whom the CTO took the goods in charge; 
(b) insufficiency or defective condition of the packing or marks; 
(c) handling, loading, stowage or unloading of the goods by the 
consignor or the consignee or any person acting on behalf of 
the consignor or the consignee; 
(d) inherent vice of the goods; 
(e) strike, lockout, stoppage or restraint of labour, the consequences 
of which the CTO could not avoid by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence; 
(f) any cause or event which the CTO could not avoid and the 
consequences of which he could not prevent by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence; 
(g) a nuclear incident if the operator of a nuclear installation or 
a person acting for him is liable for this damage under an 
applicable international Convention or national law governing 
liability in respect of nuclear energy-
The burden of proving that the loss or damage was due to one cr more 
of the above causes or events shall rest upon the CTO» 
When the CTO establishes that, in the circumstances of the case, the 
loss or damage could be attributed to one or more of the causes or 
events specified in (b) to (d) above, it shall be presumed that it 
was so caused. The claimant shall, however, be entitled to prove 
that the loss or damage was nots in fact, caused, wholly or partly 
by one or more of these causes or events, - „ , /8, Rules 
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B« Rules applicable when the stage of transport where the loss or 
da/rage occurred is known* 
Rule 13 
Mien in accordance with Rule 5 (e) hereof the CTO is liable to 
pay compensation in respect of loss or damage to the goods and the 
stage of transport where the loss or damage occurred is known, the 
liability of the CTO in respect of such loss or damage shall be 
determinedj 
(a) by the provisions contained in any international Convention 
or national law, which provisions! 
(i) cannot be departed from by private.contract, to the 
detriment of the claimant, and 
(ii) would have applied if the claimant had made a separate and 
direct contract with the CTO in respect of the particular 
stage' of transport where, the loss or damage occurred and 
received as evidence thereof any particular document which 
must be issued in order to make such international Convention 
or national law applicable; or 
(b) by the provisions contained in any international Convention 
v relating to the carriage of goods by the mode of transport used 
to carry the goods at the time when the loss or damage occurred, 
provided thats 
(i) no other international Convention or national law would 
apply by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-paragraph 
fa) of this Rule and that; 
(ii) it is expressly stated in the CT Document that all the 
provisions contained in such Convention shall govern the 
carriage of goods by such mode of transport; where 
/such mode 
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such mode of transport is by sea, such provisions shall , : 
apply to all goods whether carried on deck or under deck; or 
(c) by the provisions contained in any contract of carriage by inland 
waterways entered into between the CTO and any sub-contractor, 
provided that; 
(i) no international Convention or national law is applicable 
under subparagraph (a) of this Rule, or is applicable., or 
could have been made applicable, by express provision in 
accordance with sub-paragraph (b) of this Rule and that 
(ii) it is expressly stated in the CT Document that such contract 
provisions shall apply; or 
(d) by the provisions of Rules 11 and 12 in cases where the provisions 
of sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above do not apply, 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Rule 5 (b) and (c), when, 
under the provisions of the preceding paragraph,, the liability 
of the CTO shall be determined by the provisions of any international 
Convention or national law, this liability shall be determined as 
though the CTO were the carrier referred to in any such Convention or 
national law. However, the CTO shall not be exonerated from 
liability where the loss or damage is caused or contributed to by 
the acts or omissions of the CTO in his capacity as such, or of 
his servants or agents when acting in such capacity and net in the 
performance of. the carriage. 
Rule 14 
If, in the case of delay, the claimant proves that damage has 
resulted, other than loss of or damage to the goods, the liability 
of the CTO for such damage shall be compensation not exceeding the 
/freight payable 
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freight payable for the goods concerned or the value of such goods 
as determined in accordance with Rule 11 hereof, whichever is the 
lesser. 
Rule 15 
The CTO shall, however, not be liable to pay compensation for damage 
resulting from delay when such damage could not have been reasonably 
foreseen by the CTO at the time of•issuance of the CT document, nor 
shall the CTO be liable to pay compensation if the delay was caused 
by any of the events enumerated in Rule 12 (a) to (g). 
The burden of proving that the delay was due to one or more of the 
above causes or events shall rest upon the CTO. 
When the CTO establishes that, in the circumstances of the case, 
the delay could be attributed to one or more of the causes or events 
specified in Rule 12 (b) to (d), it shall be presumed that it was 
so caused. The claimant shall, however, be entitled to prove that 
the delay was not, in fact, caused wholly or partly by one or more 
of these causes or events» 

V: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNIFORM RULES FOR A COMBINED TRANSPORT 
. DOCUMENT AND THE HAGUE RULES, AND THE SITUATION OF THE COMBINED' "" -
TRANSPORT OPERATOR AS REGARDS INDEMNITIES AND RECOURSE 
Question submitted by ECLA; 
"The Uniform rules for a combined transport document, of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, appears to create the possibility 
that the CTO, in determined circumstances, could receive a different 
amount from the transporter, in terms of a settlement of claims, than 
he could be obligated to pay to the shipper. In the case of the Network 
system1 adopted in the Rules, this only seems possible when the following 
four conditions apply: (a) the CTO has evidence against the transporter, 
(b) there ère nò »obligatory* international conventions or national laws 
which apply, (c) the shipper and CTO have not explicitly stated in the 
CT Document that all of the provisions in à »voluntary1 international 
convention shell apply, and (d) this does not involve inland waterways 
transport. The number of cases where all of these conditions would hold 
is difficult to anticipate, especially given that it is not clear, under 
the wording of Rule 13 paragraphs a) and b) of the ICC Rules, if the 
Hague Rules would be an 'obligatory* or »voluntary* international 
convention. Article VI of the Hague Rules allows these Rules to be 
departed from by private contract, in the case of non-ordinary commercial 
shipmènts, to the detriment of the claimant in terms of liability 
(although, of course, we would not expect the shipper to want to depart 
from the Hague Rules to his detriment in economic terms}, and they might 
thus be considered a *voluntary* international convention which would 
have to be expressly referred to in the CT Document in order for liability 
conditions of the Hague Rules to be applied to the CTO, If it is supposed 
that the Hague Rules are among the 'international Convention or national 
law* mentioned in paragraph a) of Rule 13 of the ICC Rules, then the' 
/question arises 
74-9-2149 
question arises why specific mention is made to sea transport in para-
graph b) of the same Rule, rather than in paragraph a) or a separate 
paragraph." 
Replies: 
The following are summaries of replies by reknown European and 
United States experts on maritime law. 
Respondent 1; 
v « p a r a g e H M « I 'M awm» 
The intention in Rule 13 A is to refer to international conventions 
or national laws which contain rules of a mandatory character - i.e. which 
cannot be departed from by private contract - to the detriment of the 
claimant. The problem is. that.such conventions or national laws custom-
arily contain mandatory as well as non-mandatory provisions. Further, 
apart from the provision in the European CMR article 41, there is 
nothing in the major international transport conventions to prevent the 
carrier from accepting a hxghsr liability than under the mandatory 
provisions, which are merely intended to give the customer a "minimum" 
protection. In this seriaa, the provisions are only mandatory in one 
direction. A literal' interpretation of Rule 13 A may therefore lead to 
the somewhat surprising result that only the rules of the CMR are 
intended. Nevertheless, it was clearly intended to incorporate inter-
national conventions or national laws containing mandatory rulss 
applicable for the protection of the cargo owner and, further, to give 
the CTO the benefit of the particular exceptions from a limitation of a 
liability contained in such international conventions or national laws, 
irrespective of the fact that he might be entitled to abstain from such 
protection. Thus, Rule 13 A is certainly intended to incorporate the. 
provisions of the Hague Rules. 
/As to the 
As to the specific reference in Rule 13 8 to the situation where 
it should be expressly stated in the CT document that all provisions 
contained in a convention shall govern the carriage of goods by the 
relevant mode of transport, this reference was deemed necessary to cover 
the situation when the Hague Rules do not apply ex propio vigore but only 
by way of a special clause (a so-called Clause Paramount). 
Under the system of the ICC Uniform rules and the TCM Draft it is 
possible that the CTO will have to pay his customer an amount without 
having a full recourse against the carrier who has performed the 
transport. The "network liability system" of the ICC Rules and of the 
TCM Draft tend to preserve recourse possibilities better than a uniform 
system of liability would have done. On the other hand, recourse may 
very well be barred owing to certain circumstances (failure to notify 
claims, time bar, insufficient evidence as against the carrier, etc.). 
The other possibility, namely that the CTO will recover more from the 
carrier than he has been obligated to pay to the customer is hardly 
likely to occur. The carrier, standing in a contractual relationship 
with the CTO, can never be legally bound to pay moire for the loss 
Incurred by the CTO than is required to cover his loss. And the loss 
incurred by the CTO can never exceed the amount which he will have to •v 
pay to the customer. In this context, I would like to stress the fact, 
that the uniform liability - if kept at a low level - could carry with 
it the result that the customer would have been better off had he 
concluded a contract directly with the underlying carrier instead of 
the CTO. Possibly, under some national systems of law, the customer 
would in order to solve such situations be given a contractual remedy 
directly against the underlying carrier, in spite of the fact that the 
contract in a formal sense merely exists between the CTO and the under-
lying carrier (quasi-contractual remedy). 
/ Respondent 2s 
As to the possibility that the CTO could recover more than he pays 
to the cargo owner, the CTO's cause of action against the actual carrier 
is for indemnity and the provable damages in an action for indemnity are, 
therefore, limited to the amount paid. The cargo owner may be. free to 
seek a higher amount, however, than that received from the CTD. The ICC 
Rules deal only with the cargo owner's right against the (TO, leaving 
the cargo owner's right against the actual carrier intact. Thus, if 
the limitation of the actual carrier's liability should be higher than 
the limitation of the CTO's liability, the cargo owner could recover 
the higher amount even though the CTO's recovery would be limited to 
the lower amount. 
VI: DRAFT ABTICLES FOR NETWORK SYSTEM -
FRENCH | VERSION 
Article 9 
1, The CTO shall be liable for loss of, or damage to, the goods 
occurring between the time when he receives the goods into his charge 
and the time of delivery, 
2, The CTO shall, however, be relieved of this liability for any loss 
or damage to the extent that such loss or damage arose or resulted from: 
(a) any unforeseeable or unavoidable incident the consequences of 
which the CTO cannot mitigate; 
(b) inherent vice of the goods; 
(c) the wrongful act of the consignor or the consignee; 
(d) a nuclear accident if, under special regulations, regarding 
liability in respect of nuclear energy in force in a 
contracting State, the operator of a nuclear plant or a person 
acting for him is responsible for this damage, 
3, The burden of proving that the loss or damage was due to one of the 
causes, or events, specified in paragraph 2 of this Article shall rest 




1, When the CTO is liable for compensation in respect of loss of, or 
damage to, the goods, such compensation shall be calculated by reference 
to the value of such goods at the place and time they are delivered to 
the consignee or at the place and time when, in accordance with the 
contract of combined transport (...) they should have been so delivered. 
* UN/IMCO Conference on International Container Traffic (E/CONF.59/17), 
/2. The CTO shall 
2, The CTO shall pay compensation not exceeding ..... in respect of 
damage resulting from delay, 
: Article 12 
Notwithstanding anything provided for in the other Articles of 
this Convention, when the place where the loss, damage or delay, occurred 
is knownj the liability of the CTO is determined by the international 
convention or the national law applicable to the carriage during which 
the loss, damage or delay occurred. 
VII: DRAFT ARTICLES FOR UNIFORM SYSTEM * 
Presented by Australia, Car©da, 
Norway and Sweden 
Article 9A 
1. The CTO shall be liable for loss of or damage to the goods 
occurring between the time when he received the goods into his charge 
and the time of delivery» 
2. The CTO shall be liable for damage caused by delay in delivery of 
the goods. Delay in delivery of the goods shall be deemed to occur when 
the CTO has not made the goods available for delivery to the consignee 
within the agreed time-limit or, failing an agreed time-limit, when the 
actual duration of the whole combined transport operation, having regard 
to the circumstances of the case, exceeds the time it would be reasonable 
to allow for its diligent completion. 
3. The CTO shall, however, not be liable if he proves that the loss, 
damage or delay was caused by circumstances which he could not acid and 
the consequences of which he was unable to prevent. 
Article 9A bis 
In any event the CTO shall not be liable if he proves that the loss, 
damage or delay was caused by: 
(a) an act or omission of the consignor or consignee, insufficiency 
of packing or marks, or the inherent defect, quality or vice of 
the goods} 
r 
[b J act, neglect or default in the navigation of a ship occurring 
during carriage by water; -JHf-
(c) fire occurring during carriage by water, unless the fire was 
caused by the actual fault or privity of the CTO or the water 
* UN/IMCO Conference on International Container Traffic (E/CONF,59/17). 
** A final clause should provide for revision of Sub-paragraphs (b) and 
(c) in case the Hague Rules are revised. 
/carrier or by lack 
carrier or by lack of exercise of due diligence to make the 
vessel sea-worthy, properly to man, equip and supply the 
vessel or to make it fit and safe for the reception, 
carriage and preservation of the goods, ' 
(d) a nuclear accident if, under special regulations in force in 
a contracting State governing liability in respect of nuclear 
energy, the operator of a nuclear plant or a person acting 
for him is responsible for this damage. 
Article 1QA 
1, When the CTO is liable for compensation in respect Of loss of, 
or damage to, the goods, such compensation shall be calculated by 
reference to the value of such goods at the place and time they are 
delivered to the consignee or at the place and time when, in accordance 
with the contract of combined transport (...) they should have been so 
delivered, 
2. • The value of the goods shall be fixed according to the commodity 
exchange price or, if there be no such: price, according to the current 
market price or, if there be no commodity exchange price or current 
market price, by reference to the normal value of goods of the same 
kind and quality, 
3. Compensation shall not, however, exeed ..... francs per kilo of 
gross weight of the goods lost or damaged. The. minimum grass weight of 
such goods shall be deemed to be ..... kilos. 
4, Higher compensation may be claimed only when, with the consent of 
the CTO, the value for the goods declared by the consignor which exceeds 
the limits laid down in this Article has been stated in the CT Document. 
In that case the amount of the declared value shall be substituted for 
that limit. 
• ^ . /Article 11A 
Article 11A 
1, In case of delay, if the claimant proves that damage has resulted, 
other than loss of or damage to the goods, the CTO shall pay in respect 
of such damage compensation not exceeding ..... 
2. If the goods have not been trade available (for delivery) to the 
consignee within sixty days after the period of time as defined in 
paragraph 1, the claimant shall have the right to treat them as lost. 

Basic rules governing the responsibility of the carrier 
(Replacing article 3(l) and (2) , article 4 ( 1 ) and 4(2) 
of 1924 Brussels Concention) 
1. The carrier shall be liable for all loss of or damage to goods 
carried if the occurrence which caused the loss or damage took place 
while the goods were in his charge as defined in article ..., unless 
the carrier proves that he, his servants and agents took all measures 
that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its 
consequences. 
2. In case of fire, the carrier shall be liable, provided the claimant 
proves that the fire arose due to fault or negligence on the part of the 
carrier, his servants or agents» 
3. Where fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, his servants 
or agents, concurs with another cause to produce loss or damage, the 
carrier shall be liable only for that portion of the loss or damage 
attributable to such fault or negligence, provided that the carrier 
bears the burden of proving the amount of loss or damage not attributable 
thereto. 
(There does not exist a corresponding provision in the 1924 
Brussels Convention). 
Article 
1. VJhere the carrier has exercised an option provided for in the 
contract of carriage to entrust the performance of the carriage or a 
part thereof to an actual carrier, the carrier shall nevertheless remain 
* Report of the Working Group on the International Shipping 
Legislation (United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law) A/CN.9/WG.III/WP,13, 28 November, 1973. 
/responsible for 
responsible for the entire carriage according to the provisions of this 
Convention. 
2. The actual carrier also shall be responsible for the carriage 
performed by him according to the provisions of this Convention. 
3. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier and the 
actual carrier shall not exceed the limits provided for in this Convention 
4. Nothing in this article shall prejudice any right of recourse as 
between the carrier and the actual carrier. 
Articlê  m . . . . . . 
Where the contract of carriage provides that a designated part of 
the carriage covered by the contract shall be performed by a person other 
than the carrier (through bill of lading)p. the responsibility of the 
carrier and of the actual carrier shall be determined in accordance with 
the provisions of the previous article. 
2. However, the oarrier may exonerate himself from liability for loss 
of, damage (or delay) to the goods caused by events occurring while the 
goods are in the charge of the actual carrier provided that the burden 
of proving that any such loss, damage (or delay) was so caused, shall 
rest upon the carrier^/ 
Limitation of liability • 
, (Article 4(5) of 1924 Brussels Convention; article 2 of 
1968 Brussels Protocol) , 
Article 
1. The liability of the carrier for loss of.or damage to the goods 
shall be limited to an amount equivalent to ( ) francs per package 
or other shipping unit or ( ) francs per kilo of gross weight of the 
goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher. • 
/2. For the 
3 
2. For the purpose of calculating which amount is the higher in 
accordance with paragraph 1, thB following rules shall apply: 
(a) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is 
used to consolidate goods, the package or other shipping units enumerated 
in the bill of lading as packed in such article of transport shall be 
deemed packages or shipping units. Except as aforesaid the goods in 
such article of transport shall be deemed one shipping unit, 
(b) In cases where the article of transport itself has been 
lost or damaged, that article of transport shall, when not owned or 
otherwise supplied by the carrier, be considered one separate shipping 
unit. 
3. A franc means a unit consisting of 65.5 milligrammes of gold of 
millesimal fineness 900, 
4. The amount referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be 
converted into the national currency of the State of the court or 
arbitration tribunal seized of the case on the basis of the official 
value of that currency by reference to the unit defined in paragraph 3 
of this article on the date of the judgement or arbitration award. If 
there is no such official value, the competent authority of the State 
concerned shall determine what shall be considered as the official 
value for the purposes of this Convention. 
